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Abstract— To offer location-based services, service providers
need to have access to Location Information (LI) regarding the
users which they wish to serve; this is a potential privacy threat.
Constraints, i.e. statements limiting the use and distribution of LI,
that are securely bound to the LI, have been proposed as a means
to reduce this threat. However, constraints may themselves reveal
information to any potential LI user — that is, the constraints
themselves may also be a privacy threat. To address this problem
we introduce the notion of a LI Preference Authority (LIPA).
A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine LI constraints
and make decisions about LI distribution without revealing the
constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is achieved
by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a LIPA
encryption key. This ensures that the LI is only revealed at the
discretion of the LIPA.
Index Terms— Location-based services, constraints, trusted
third party, security model, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the potential for services provided by mobile phones
advances [1], it may no longer be appropriate to call such
devices mobile phones. Mobile phones already provide far
more than the voice communications for which they were
originally designed. Text messaging and video download are
just two examples of the range of services which are now
available to the consumer. We therefore use here the more
general term ‘mobile device’.
Amongst the features currently available in mobile devices
are location-based services. Location-based services may also
be provided to devices which are not mobile, such as desktop
PCs. We thus refer here to ‘user devices’, which include both
mobile and non-mobile devices. We can then define a location-
based service as a service based on the location of a user
device [2]. In order to facilitate the provision of such a service,
it is necessary that LI is made available to one or more entities;
this is at the root of the privacy issues with location-based
services.
To provide a location-based service, it may be necessary
for LI regarding the user to be passed to an entity with whom
the user has little or no basis for a trust relationship. It is
unreasonable, however, for a user to be forced to allow its
LI to be provided to any entity which requests it, since this
would leave the end user with no control over its LI, which
is, of course, personal information. It is also unreasonable for
a service provider to freely distribute the LI of a user to other
entities without permission.
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This paper introduces a mechanism designed to enable the
end user to take advantage of the convenience of location-
based services, and yet also control the way LI is used, stored
and distributed.
We begin by introducing constraints [3]. The use of con-
straints is a technique which allows a user to dictate the way in
which LI is managed. We look at some of the disadvantages of
constraints which motivate the design of the scheme proposed
in this paper.
We next look at the security requirements for methods to
enable control of, and privacy for, LI. With this in mind, the
notion of a Location Information Preference Authority (LIPA)
is introduced. A LIPA is essentially a trusted party which helps
control the distribution of LI and accompanying constraints. LI
is distributed to service providers in the form of an ‘LI token’.
The LI token includes LI securely bound to its constraints.
The LI and constraints are also encrypted using the LIPA’s
public key, ensuring that unauthorised entities cannot see this
information.
We then look at how the LIPA mechanism may be used to
address problems with constraints, LI control, and privacy.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
In previous work, a variety of different aspects of security
for location-based services have been considered. Existing
schemes for LI privacy are in many cases geared towards
the available wireless technology architectures. These include
IEEE 802.11 [4] networks, mobile IP [5] and GSM net-
works [6].
Myles et al. [7] describe constraints which may be used
to control the distribution of location information, although
they do not describe cryptographic protection mechanisms to
provide privacy. A user registers their privacy requirements
with a location server, referred to as LocServ. Entities which
require location information make requests to the LocServ,
providing their own privacy policies. Based on this, the
LocServ can then make a decision whether or not to provide
location information. This mechanism does not provide any
means for entities to pass on information to other entities.
Aura et al. [8] investigate authenticated location information
in the Mobile IPv6 protocol. Aura et al. see authenticated
location information as a defence mechanism against false
routing information, which could lead to other forms of attack.
The subject of authentic location information is also discussed
in [9]. The discussion in this latter paper concerns the location
of GSM devices. The motivation is to support location-based
access control mechanisms and the inclusion of LI in audit
logs. By contrast, the primary objective of this paper is the
privacy of personal location information.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) geopriv work-
ing group is developing a general model for the protection of
location information [10]. This model is primarily concerned
with securing the Location Object (LO), which encompasses
location information and other necessary information which
may include constraints. They describe a general model which
addresses the security requirements for such an object, en-
compassing a variety of scenarios. Our LIPA model looks at a
specific scenario for a generally distributed LI token containing
constraints and LI.
III. LI, CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
A. LI entities
Below are descriptions of the entities in our simple model
of a system in which LI is used [3].
• Location Information (LI). This is data which provides
information regarding an LI subject’s location. LI may
occur in many forms. In general, we can divide LI into
two types, namely Inferred LI and Actual LI. Actual LI
refers to a directly calculated geographical location. This
type of data indicates, to some degree of accuracy, the
physical location of an LI subject. Inferred LI is, by
contrast, obtained by implication. For example, if a user is
present on a network, this implies that they are likely to be
within an certain vicinity, although no specific calculation
of geographical LI has taken place.
• LI subject. An LI subject is the entity about whom
location information is being gathered, managed and
used. This entity is most commonly a human user.
• Location-Based Service (LBS). This is a service based
on LI, e.g. a vehicular navigation service.
• Location Information Preference Authority (LIPA).
This entity, discussed in more detail in Section IV, acts
like a trusted party on behalf of the LI subject. There
may exist many LIPA entities, where the LI subject will
typically be able to choose its preferred LIPA. Where
an LI subject device has the capability, this device could
itself act as the LIPA.
• Malicious Party. This is an entity with malicious intent.
A malicious party may act as a threat to the confiden-
tiality, integrity or availability of LI for one or more LI
subjects.
• User Device (UD). This entity is a device with which the
LI subject may interact, e.g. to invoke a location-based
service. Such a device may either be static, e.g. a desk
top computer, or more typically mobile, such as a mobile
phone or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). It is, in fact,
this device regarding which LI is generated rather than
the user him/herself, since there is typically no way to
directly measure the location of individuals. Thus this
entity is a key part of the model.
• LI gatherer. This is an entity which gathers or possesses
LI about an LI subject and then creates an LI token using
this information. The LI token is discussed further in
section IV.
A GPS receiver is an example of part of an LI gatherer,
as it obtains location data. An entity in a GSM network
which keeps signalling data for a UD is also an example
of part of a LI gatherer. Although a GSM network does
not normally pass on this LI (except in certain special
cases), it certainly possesses such information, and could,
in an appropriate environment, be a valuable source of LI
for commercial use. Other examples of methods used to
generate LI can be found in [11].
• Regulator/Legal authority. This is an entity which ex-
erts legal or regulatory control over the management and
use of LI. This includes telecommunications regulators,
data privacy authorities, law enforcement bodies, and
auditors.
B. Privacy and LI
It is becoming increasingly difficult to keep personal in-
formation private [12]. It does not help that users have a
variety of incentives to surrender it. Shoppers frequently use
loyalty cards in exchange for a variety of benefits. Using these
cards, information regarding times at which users shop, what
they buy, and where they buy from, may be recorded [13].
In this case, shoppers typically have the option of denying
access [14] to such information by simply not using these
loyalty cards. However, once a customer decides to use a
loyalty card, restricting access to any information gathered
from it becomes difficult. This problem applies to all forms of
personal information, including LI, and does not only apply
to loyalty cards.
Almost certainly the main LI security issue is the potential
breach of privacy arising from the transmission of LI to entities
not trusted by the LI subject. It is important to note that
a breach of user privacy only occurs when the relationship
between the identity of the LI subject and the LI can be
established. Anonymous communication, where a user may
use a resource or service without disclosing its identity, or
communication using a pseudonym, where a user may use a
resource or service without disclosing its user identity but can
still be accountable for that use, could overcome this problem.
However, in many cases, e.g. for billing, it is difficult to
use anonymous or pseudonymous communication. Moreover,
whilst many proposals for protecting location privacy rely on
anonymisation of the LI subject, this does not seem as if it
will be a solution of general applicability – many, conceivably
most, location-based services will require the service provider
using LI to be able to associate the information with a
particular LI subject. Thus we throughout assume that the
(authorised) user of LI is permitted to learn the association
between the LI and the LI subject.
Another privacy issue is analogous to the problem of ‘spam’,
i.e. the receipt of unsolicited messages. This already poses a
huge problem in email systems [15], and has also started to
become an issue in other domains, e.g. mobile text messaging.
This is a problem which may also migrate to location-based
services and thereby become even more intrusive. For exam-
ple, service providers wishing to advertise their services [16]
may use LBSs to send unsolicited messages to LI subjects in
a given area.
To resolve these issues, LI should only be provided to
entities authorised by the LI subject.
C. Constraints
Constraints are simply statements, bound to LI, which may
be used to help control the use, storage and distribution of this
LI [3].
An LI subject may, for example, want to limit the period
of time an entity stores their LI. This will prevent entities
collating data to provide information about the LI subject’s
travel habits. Storage time may be limited either by stating
in the constraints the amount of time that the LI may be
kept from a specified start point, or by stating a point in
time after which the LI must be deleted. In the first case,
the start point may be indicated by including a time stamp in
the constraints, e.g. the time at which the LI was generated.
However, as previously discussed in [3], placing a time stamp
in the constraints allows receiving entities to learn the time
at which LI was generated, and so the time when the LI
subject was at a particular location. By contrast, a mechanism
stating the time when the LI expires will limit the information
revealed, as the time at which the LI subject was at a location
cannot be precisely determined.
Limiting the distribution of LI ensures that LI is only sent
to entities authorised by the LI subject. Restrictions on LI
distribution may be specified either by stating the entities who
are authorised to receive the LI, or by listing the entities
not authorised to receive the LI. However, statements about
permitted distribution give a receiving entity knowledge about
relationships between the LI subject and other entities. For
example, it enables entities to know which other entities are
trusted by the LI subject and those which are not.
LI use may be restricted by stating how LI is or is not to be
used. For example, an LI subject may only want their LI used
for navigation purposes, and the constraints could state this.
Conversely, the constraints could contain a negative statement
indicating that, for example, the LI is not to be used for
advertising purposes. These types of statement also provide
information about the preferences of an LI subject, i.e. they
are themselves a potential breach of user privacy.
Thus, providing information about how LI is to be managed
allows personal information to be divulged. This is because
the preferences of an LI subject are themselves personal
information. Thus, in order to fully protect user privacy,
the statements in the constraints must somehow be enforced
without divulging the contents of the constraints to the LI
consumers.
IV. A MECHANISM TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR
CONSTRAINTS
In this section the LIPA-based mechanism, providing pri-
vacy control for LI and associated constraints, is described.
A. Overview of the mechanism
In order to ensure that the information held within the con-
straints remains private, we propose the use of a trusted party
which we call a Location Information Preference Authority
(LIPA). The LI gatherer is assumed to be in possession of
the list of preferred LIPAs for each LI subject for which it
generates LI. This is an indication of the LIPAs trusted by the
LI subject. The LI gatherer must be trusted by the LI subject
to act according to its wishes.
1) LI gathering. The first step in our mechanism involves
the provision of LI by the gatherer. The LI gatherer
may be at any location, including in the UD itself. The
LI gatherer may obtain LI in response to a request by
an LBS provider or an LI subject, or it may constantly
collect LI for a large number of LI subjects.
2) LI token generation. The LI gatherer then creates what
we refer to as an LI token. This includes both LI and
accompanying constraints. The LI and constraints are
encrypted by the LI gatherer using the public key of the
LIPA. This ensures that only the LIPA is able to view
this information. Also contained within the scope of the
token is information which helps to identify both the
LI subject and the LIPA, together with a unique token
identifier. The LI token includes the signature of the LI
gatherer, guaranteeing the integrity of the LI token. This
also provides evidence to receiving entities regarding the
identity of the LI gatherer. An LI gatherer may generate
several tokens for the same LI, e.g. if an LI subject
uses two or more LIPAs. There is also provision for the
inclusion of an optional public key certificate for the LI
gatherer’s public key.
3) LI token distribution. When LI is required, an LI token
is provided to the LBS provider wishing to use the LI
for service provision. This could occur in a variety of
ways, e.g. by using third party LI token repositories, by
sending the LI token via the UD, or by direct transfer
from the LI gatherer to the service provider.
4) LI token verification and decryption. Once an LBS
provider wishing to use LI receives an LI token, it must
submit it to the appropriate LIPA. From the LI token
the LBS provider can establish the identity of the LI
subject, the identifier for the LI token and the identity
of the LIPA, but not the LI or constraints since they are
encrypted.
Upon receiving the LI token, the LIPA verifies the
signature, then decrypts the LI and the constraints, and
checks if access to this LI is permitted for the requesting
LBS provider. If access to the LI is permitted by the
constraints, the LIPA returns the LI, the date/time of
expiry of the LI, and the identifier of the LI token, all
encrypted with the public key of the LBS provider, and
signed by the LIPA. If permission is denied, a message
stating this, together with the identity of the LI token,
is returned to the LBS provider.
There are numerous ways that the LIPA may generate income
for the provision of its service. The LIPA may charge for each
request for LI which it receives, or each successful request for
LI, i.e. when LI is sent to a LBS provider by a LIPA. Also,
billing may be per LI token or per individual request. The
entities which could potentially be billed for the LIPA service
are the LI subject and the LBS provider. Billing the LI subject
may result in a scenario where LBSs could request LI from
the LIPA, which will charge the LI subject whether or not
the LBS provider gives any service to the subject, and this is
clearly not a desirable scenario. Alternatively, billing the LBS
provider appears a more appropriate solution since the LBS
provider can potentially recover the cost of obtaining the LI
by including it in the charge for services provided.
The LI gatherer (unless it is the LI subject him/herself)
will also typically require a means of obtaining payment for
providing LI tokens. However, the LI gatherer may have no
obvious party to charge except for the LI subject. In cases
where the LI gatherer provides LI tokens for use by LBS
providers not providing services to the LI subject, this is
probably unviable. Another possibility might be for the LIPA
entities to pass on a percentage of charges they make to LBS
providers to the LI gatherers.
B. Requirements for use of the mechanism
This section describes the requirements on the entities
involved in use of the mechanism.
The LI gatherer is the entity responsible for creating LI. It
must possess a signature key pair. It must also possess a trusted
copy of the public encryption key for all the LIPAs used by
the LI subjects for which it generates/collects LI. These keys
are used to encrypt the LI and the constraints in the LI token.
The LI gatherer must also be in possession of a reliable copy
of the constraints and LIPA preferences for each LI subject
for which it generates LI.
The LIPA entity must possess both a signature key pair
and an asymmetric encryption key pair. It must also possess
a trusted copy of the verification key of every LI gatherer
whose LI it needs to process, and a trusted copy of the public
encryption key of each service provider to whom it might
wish to provide decrypted LI. (The need for LIPAs to hold
public keys of LI gatherers and LBS providers can be obviated
by requiring LI gatherers and LBS providers to obtain and
distribute public key certificates).
Each LBS provider must possess a trusted copy of the public
signature verification key of each LIPA with which it interacts.
It must also possess an asymmetric encryption key pair.
It is assumed that all the necessary encryption and signa-
ture algorithms have been globally agreed before use of the
scheme.
C. LI creation
The entity responsible for generating LI is also responsible
for creating what we refer to as an LI token. At the time of
creation (or acquisition) of the LI, we suppose that the LI
gatherer generates accompanying constraints C based on pre-
specified LI subject preferences. The structure of the LI token
is described below.
LI Token: EeL(LI‖C)‖ IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖ [CertG]
where: EK(X) denotes the asymmetric encryption of data
string X using the public key K; SA(X) denotes a digital
signature (not providing message recovery) computed on data
string X using the private key of entity A; eX represents
the public encryption key of entity X; X‖Y represents the
concatenation of data items X and Y ; L represents the LIPA;
S represents the LI subject; G represents the LI gatherer;
IX represents an identifier for entity X , e.g. IG denotes an
identifier for the LI gatherer G; CertG is the public key
certificate of the LI gatherer; [...] represents an optional data
item.
The LI token is divided into four parts: the encrypted part,
the plaintext part, the digital signature, and the (optional)
public key certificate of the LI gatherer. The encrypted section
contains the LI and the constraints, C. These are encrypted
using the public key of the LIPA, eL. This ensures that entities
other than the LIPA cannot see this information. The plaintext
part consists of IL, IS , TokenID and IG. The identifier IL
identifies the LIPA whose public key has been used to encrypt
the LI and the constraints. This enables any entity wishing to
gain access to the contents of an LI token to determine which
LIPA it can be requested from. This identifier could take a
variety of forms, e.g. a URL or an IP address. The identifier
IS allows any entity to identify the LI Subject to which the
LI in the token relates. This identifier may be a pseudonym.
The TokenID is an identifier which, in conjunction with IG,
enables an LI token to be uniquely identified. The identifier
IG allows any entity to determine which entity generated the
LI token. This also enables entities to decide which public
key to use to verify the digital signature. This identifier may
also be a pseudonym. The digital signature is computed over
both the encrypted and plaintext parts of the LI token. This
provides assurance that the LI Token has not been tampered
with, and authenticates the entity which created the LI. The
certificate CertG may be optionally included in the LI token.
This makes it easier for LIPAs which communicate with many
LI subjects to obtain the necessary public keys.
Before proceeding, note that the encrypted part of the LI
token could alternatively be encrypted using a symmetric en-
cryption scheme with a shared secret key. The major advantage
of such an approach would be that a symmetric encryption
algorithm is typically much less computationally intensive that
an asymmetric scheme. The main disadvantage is the key
management overhead, since such an approach would require
each LI gatherer to share a secret key with every LIPA with
which it ‘does business’. A variety of different mechanisms
exist to provide the necessary key management functions —
see, for example, [17].
D. LI distribution
Section IV-C describes the structure of an LI token. When
there is a request for LI or, when an LI subject requests a
service, the LI token is sent to the relevant LBS provider.
LI Gatherer → P :
EeL(LI‖C)‖ IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖ [CertG]
where:
A → B represents the communication of a message from
entity A to entity B; and P represents the LBS provider.
LI should always be distributed within an LI token, regard-
less of who is sending the LI. The message above describes
direct communication of the LI token from the LI gatherer to
the LBS provider; however, as mentioned earlier, LI tokens
may also be distributed via third parties and between LBS
providers.
E. LI use
This section describes how an entity uses an LI token. When
a LBS provider decides that it want to gain access to the LI
within an LI token, it must send the LI token to the LIPA
whose identifier is in the token, and hence whose public key
was used to encrypt the LI in the token.
P → LIPA entity:
EeL(LI‖C)‖ IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖
[CertG]‖[CertP ]
The above indicates that the LBS provider sends the LI token
to the LIPA entity. The LBS provider may also optionally
include a certificate for its public key, to avoid the need for the
LIPA to possess a trusted copy of every LBS provider’s public
key. When the LIPA receives the LI token, it must first verify
the signature and decrypt the enclosed LI and constraints. If
the signature is invalid, or the token syntax is not as expected,
then the LBS provider must be sent the ‘Permission Denied’
message (see below). The LIPA must then check that the LBS
is permitted by the constraints of the LI subject to receive this
LI. The LIPA must also check the authenticity of the LBS
provider, which may be based on the certificate provided by
the LBS provider. Details of a mechanism to provide this check
for authenticity are not discussed further in this document. If
the LBS provider is permitted to have access to the LI in the
token, then it may be sent. The structure of the message used
to send the LI back to P is described below. The LIPA also
keeps a record of the LI token and the entity to which it is
providing LI.
LIPA entity → P :
EeP (LI‖Expiry‖TokenID)
SL(EeP (LI‖Expiry‖TokenID))
The message from the LIPA to the service entity contains
two parts: the encrypted part, which contains LI , Expiry
and the TokenID, and the signature. The encrypted part is
encrypted with the public key of the service entity requesting
the LI. This ensures that only the service entity can read
this information, preventing malicious parties intercepting data
while in transit. Expiry is a time-stamp extracted from the
constraints and specifies when the LI expires, i.e. when the
LI should be deleted. This is the only information from the
constraints which needs to be sent to the service entity. The
TokenID allows the LI subject to relate the LI received from
the LIPA to the LI token from which it has been taken. The
digital signature allows the receiving entity to check whether
the message has been tampered with during transit.
If the requesting entity is not permitted to have access to
the LI in the token then the following PermissionDenied
message is sent to the requesting entity:
LIPA entity →P :
TokenID‖PermissionDenied
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we describe how our mechanism addresses
control and privacy issues for LI. We also describe certain
remaining issues with the mechanism. These could provide
suitable topics for further research.
The primary aim is to provide a mechanism which en-
ables the control of access to LI and constraints, enabling
a greater degree of privacy without divulging extra personal
information. By enabling the LIPA to make decisions based
on constraints, untrusted entities do not gain access to the
information found in constraints or LI. However, this does
mean that the LIPA has access to both the constraints and
the LI. Should the LIPA be compromised, the malicious party
would have access to both the LI and the constraints of any
LI subject using its services.
Once an entity is in possession of LI, maintaining control of
this information is a difficult task. Ensuring that LI is managed
according to the preferences of the LI subject once an entity
possesses it, can only be based on trust. A problem inherent
to LI is that when an entity has plaintext LI, they are free to
do with it as they please. Our mechanism aims to provide LI
only to entities which can be trusted, giving the LI subject
control over their LI. Of course, even trusted entities cannot
be trusted all the time and once these trusted entities have
this LI, the LI subject can only rely on a regulatory or legal
authority to ensure that messages are being transmitted in the
manner which has been previously agreed. If an entity wishes
to redistribute the LI of an LI subject, it should only distribute
the LI token. If it chooses to redistribute LI in other forms,
then this can only be addressed by some form of policing,
e.g. through peer enforcement. Of course this could enhanced
by a regulatory authority which ensures that rules are being
adhered to.
Auditability should allow the identification of entities acting
in violation of the rules set by the constraints. Identifying
these entities is difficult, and is a desirable property. The
use of peer pressure to enable auditability was introduced
in [3]. To prevent unauthorised distribution of LI, its origin,
i.e. the entity responsible for generating the LI token, must
be verifiable. In addition, users of LI must be accountable for
its use. Therefore, if a malicious entity redistributes LI in a
way prohibited by the LI constraints, the recipient will detect
this, and the malicious entity can be held responsible for the
breach of constraints.
An additional concern is the potential for overloading the
LIPA with requests for access to LI. This entity is of course,
the central point for LI requests from service providers. This
problem can be addressed by distributing the LIPA service
across multiple servers, thereby removing the potential bottle-
neck and the single point of failure.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the issue of control and privacy of
LI and associated usage constraints by introducing a Trusted
Third Party based framework. We have introduced a mecha-
nism which gives the end user the ability to control their LI
without having to divulge additional personal data.
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